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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
District Court of Juab County-
Civil No. 3763 
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ORVILLE ANDREWS, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Cross Appellant. 
District Court of Juab County-
Civil No. 3768 
ORVILLE ANDREWS, et a.l., 
PlO!intiffs, Respondents and 
Cross Appellants, 
-vs.-
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO., 
a corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Appellanls. 
District Court of Juab County-
Civil No. 3770 
GERALD FOWKES, et al 
Plaintiffs, Respondents arnd 
Cross Appellants, 
-vs.-
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO., 
a corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Appella.nts. 
Case 
No. 8745 
RESPONDENT'S CURRENT CREEK 
IRRIGATION COMPANY'S BRIEF IN 
CIVIL NOS. 3763 and 3768 
Three cases were consolidated for trial. The first 
was brought by Current Creek Irrigation Company to en-
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join the Andrews Group from shutting off the Irrigation 
Company's wells. As to it, the court granted the in-
junction and the Andrews Group have appealed. The 
Irrigation Company is the sole respondent. The only 
question to be determined on that appeal is whether the 
court correctly enjoined the Andrews Group from re-
sorting to self-help in closing the Irrigation Company 
wells. 
The second case was an action brought in the lower 
court to review the decision of the State Engineer in ap-
proving a change application filed by the Irrigation Com-
pany. The trial court affirmed the State Engineer and 
the Andrews Group have appealed. Again, the Irrigation 
Company is the sole respondent. The only issu.e on that 
appeal is whether the trial court erred in affirming the 
State Engineer. 
The third case was brought by the Fowkes Group 
against the Andrews Group and the Irrigation Company. 
It involved the question of whether a. prior appropriator 
has a vested right to artesian pressure. The trial court 
held that they did, and ordered both Andrews and the 
Irrigation Company to take steps to pump water for the 
Fowkes Group. Both the .. A.ndrews Group and the Irri-
gation Compnny have appealed from this derision, and 
the Fo,vkPs Group are the respondents. The Irrigation 
Compa.ny hns heretofore filed its Appellant's Brief in 
this third rase. 
This hrif'f, therefore, is a respondent ,s brief, even 
though \rl\ hnYe her<?tofort~ filed an nppellnnt's brief in 
( .. nse 3770. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IRRIGATION COMPANY v. ANDREWS, 
CIVIL NO. 3763. 
In this case there is but a single issue : Did the trial 
court err in enjoining the Andrews Group from closing 
our wells 1 This issue has two facets. First, under gen-
eral law, can one water user resort to self-help and take 
it upon himself to shut off the wells of another~ And sec-
ond, was the general law here changed by private con-
tract 1 On the first point the trial court found by its Find-
ing No. 7, Tr. 169, that all matters dealing with the ad-
ministration and distribution of water are by statute 
vested in the State Engineer, and ''no one has the right 
or authority to undertake to open or close any well with-
out express permission of the State Engineer.'' The 
Andrews Group in their appeal do not challenge the cor-
rectness of this holding. They do contend, however, that 
a contract between the Irrigation Company and their pre-
decessor Roundy gave them the right to close the wells, 
and that the court erred in not making detailed findings 
concerning the contract. 
A. The court did not commit re1Jersible error in 
failing to make deta.iled fvndings on thP 
contract. 
The Andrews Group complain because the court did 
not make findings concerning a contract, under the terms 
of which the Irrigation Company was permitted to drill 
the wells on Andrews' ground. No request for findings 
was filed in the court below, nor does the brief point 
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out the manner in which the Andrews Group claims they 
were prejudiced by the failure to make findings. As a mat-
ter of substance, they were not entitled, under the con-
tract, to close the well. Had the court made findings, it 
would have been compelled, under the evidence, to so 
find. The law does, of course, require the court to make 
findings on all rna terial issues raised by the pleadings, 
and the failure to do so is error. But it is well established 
finding would not have affected the judgment. See, for 
that it is not reversible error where the only possible 
example, Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P. 2d 700, where 
the holding as reflected by the headnote is as follows: 
''Trial court's failure to make finding- regard-
ing undenied allegation in answer held harmless, 
where only one finding was possible and finding, 
if made, "Tould not have affected judgment, and 
hence new trial would be futile.'' 
The Andrews Group note the line of Utah cases 
placing the duty on the trial court to find on all material 
issues, but they do not even attempt to point to evi-
dence which 'vould justify a finding which would permit 
them to shut off our wells. They don't point to any, 
becan~e ther(_~ isn •t any such eYidenee. Had the court made 
findings, it 'vould haYe been compelled to find that the con-
tract provision involved permitted the capping of t'Yo of 
its five "·ells upon the happening of t"¥o conditions. First, 
the determination that our "¥ells interfered "ith the An-
drews flo"· 'veils, and secondly, that after the amount of 
damage rnused hy such interft~rence "¥as assessed, the 
Irrigation ('1ompnny refused to pay the damage. The evi-
dPnee stnnds nncontrndicted to the effect that no damages 
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',. 
were assessed, the Irrigation Company didn't refuse to 
pay damages which were assessed, and it is not in de-
fault. Under the express terms of the contract, Andrews 
was not entitled to shut off the wells. The background 
facts should be stated. 
The Irrigation Company wells are drilled on lands 
which are now owned by Andrews. Permission to drill 
the same was covered by three contracts (Defendant's 
Ex. 1 and plaintiffs' Ex. C and D). The first is dated 
April 7, 1951. It grants to the Irrigation Company the 
right to drill one or more wells in Sections 17 and 18. 
The second agreement is dated June 25, 1951, and it 
grants the right to drill one or more wells in Section 8. 
In consideration for the grant by Andrews' predecessor 
(Roundy) of the right to drill, the Irrigation Company 
gave Roundy the right to use water from two of the wells 
to be drilled. Neither of these said anything about cap-
ping the wells. Three of the five wells were drilled under 
these agreements. 
The third agreement is dated November 2, 1953. It 
recites that Andrews' predecessor (Roundy) owned cer-
tain flow wells, that it wasn't known whether wells to be 
drilled in Section 8 under the 1953 agreement would in-
terfere with those flows, but it provided that if the flow in 
any one of Andrews flow wells was diminished, each party 
to the agreement would choose a competent engineer and 
they, "\Vith the State Engineer, were to determine whether 
the driving of any well under the November, 1953, agree-
ment had affected or diminished the flow of the Andre~Ts 
;) 
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flow wells. In the event these engineers determined that 
the wells drilled under the 1953 agreemnt did interfere, 
then they were to assess the amount of damage which was 
caused to the flow wells by the interference. The Irriga-
tion Company agreed to pay such damages, or in the alter-
native to "immediately cap and discontinue the use of 
any such well so drilled hereunder.'' 
Two wells were drilled under this agreement. The 
Andrews Group were capping all the wells (R. Vol. 1; 
R. 5, 7, 28), and at the time they were capping them they 
had not even requested appointment of engineers. Clearly, 
the Irrigation Company was not in default in failing to 
pay damages, and the closing of any of the wells was en-
tirely without right. The Irrigation Company thus 
brought suit in July of 1956 for an injunction. 
Thereafter the plaintiffs Fowkes, on September 7, 
1956, filed Civil Action 3770. The Andrews Group, on 
October 1, 1956, filed a cross-claim in which they asked the 
court to determine that the fi,e Irrigation Company wells 
interfered 'vith both the .... lndrews flow and pump wells; 
to adjudge that by rea.son of the interference Andrews 
waR damaged in the amount of $15.000, and to grant an 
• injunction to close the Irrigation ("iompany wells. This 
cross-clnim embraeed all the issues "Thich under the con-
tract \\'l"lre to haYe been decided by three engineers. It 
nlso prest")ntPrl other issues such as interference with the 
pump \\·Pll, ete. r_rlll") Irrigation Company. "·ithout objec-
tion, joint")d isslH). _.:\nd rr'\\·s had also filed CiYil Action 
3768, appealing the StatE? Engineer's decision. On October 
n, 1 !lf>6, 1 ht) thrPP eases \Yl)re consolidated for trial. and on 
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the same date trial was set for December 6, 1956 (R. Vol. 
2, R. 106). 
It was after all this that the Andrews Group, for the 
first time, on November 21st, made a demand by letter for 
the Irrigation Company to appoint an engineer 
(Ex. A21). The Irrigation Company answered to the 
effect that these issues were already before the court for 
decision (Ex. A 22). No effort was made by the Andrews 
Group to withdraw these issues from the court, but to the 
contrary they adduced evidence of their damage and 
urged the trial court to determine these issues. The trial 
court did so, and denied this claim for damages. 
Thus, under the express wording of the contract, they 
were not entitled to close any of our wells. The contract 
expressly provides that the wells drilled under the con-
tract can be capped only if damages are assessed and the 
Irrigation Company fails to pay. In this rase no damages 
'vere allowed, and the Irrigation Company is not in de-
fault for having failed to pay damages. Appellants can 
hardly complain because the court decided these issues 
instead of the engineers to be appointed under the con-
tract, for the issues were presented to the court by them. 
The Andrews Group thus had no right to cap the 
wells., Under general law no one can resort to self-help 
in the administration of water rights. Under the contract 
the wells could only be capped if damages 'vere assessed 
and we refused to pay. Neither of these has happened. 
Two other assignments of error are made on the 
appeal in this injunction case. They assert that the Irri-
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gation Company had the burden of proof on non-inter-
ference and that the evidence shows that it was the Irri-
gation Company's wells which interfered. These two 
points are re-stated by Andrews as a part of the argu-
ment on the cross appeal in the Fowkes case. They go 
to the issue of damages, and we think are more appro-
priately discussed as a part of the Fowkes case. We, 
therefore, defer our answer as to those two assignments. 
II. ANDREWS v. IRRIGATION COMPANY 
' CIVIL NO. 3768. 
This case was brought by the Andrews Group. It is 
an appeal under Sections 73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, from the 
order of the State Engineer approving the Irrigation 
Company change application. It presented to the court 
a single issue: Did the State Engineer err in approving 
the change? The Fowkes Group also raised this point in 
the District Court, but they have not appealed from its 
ruling. Thus, the Andrews Group on this issue are the 
sole appellants and the Irrigation Company is the sole 
respondent . 
. A. The cou rf d1~d ·not err in failing to 1nake 
additional findings. 
The ass~rtion that the trial court should have made 
additional findings regarding the change application is 
also raised for th~ first time on appeal No objection was 
made in th~ court belo":r concerning the adequacy of the 
finding-~. rrht' findings entered in regard to the change 
npplient.ion n rP in the form of conclusions of fact, but no-
body objf'etf'<L Finding No. 13 stated that there was 
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unappropriated water, and that "the Irrigation Com-
pany's Applications 22760 and A-2786 (the change) were 
proper, and that the statutory requirements of approval 
were complied with by applicants in each instance" (Tr. 
169). As a conclusion of law the court held that the State 
Engineer's decision on the change should be affirmed. In 
the absence of any objection to this form of finding in the 
~· court below, the objection that the findings are not suf-
ficiently detailed is not well taken when raised on appeal. 
B. The la~v and evidence both sustain the trial 
court's action in approving the change. 
The holder of an approved water application is by 
express statute granted the right to change the point of 
diversion. See Section 73-3-3, U. C. A. 1953. The only 
limitation is that the change must not impair the vested 
right of others. In determining whether a vested right 
has been impaired, the burden of proof is on the person 
opposing the change. This is noted in k9alt Lake City v. 
Boundary Springs, 2 Utah 2d 141, 210 P. 2d 453, where 
the court said : 
''A change application cannot be rejected with-
out a showing that vested rights will therehy he 
substantially impaired. While the applicant has 
the general burden of showing that no impairment 
of vested rights will result from the change, thP 
person opposing such application must fail if th(l 
evidence does not disclose that his rights 'vlll be 
impaired.'' 
Before reviewing the evidence on interference, it 
might be well to state the exact nature of the change 
which was made. The Irrigation Company filerl its 
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Application No. 22760 to appropriate 18 c. f. s. of water 
from three wells in Sections 17 and 18. This application 
was approved April 9, 1951. The application is attached 
as an exhibit to the Andrews complaint, Civil No. 3768. 
Complete logs of the wells were introduced as plaintiff's 
Ex. 3. These logs show that the first well was completed 
June 16, 1951. At that time it was tested at 1.5 c.f.s. flow 
and test pumped at the rate of 1350 g. p. m. The second 
well was completed August 6, 1951. It was tested on 
August 6th at 900 g. p. m. The Irrigation Company 
filed its change application No. A-2786 in 1953. The 
change proposed to take the same quantity of water 
(18 c. f. s.) from the basin, but to take the water from 
five wells instead of from the original three. The loca-
tions of the three wells were shifted about one-half mile 
north into Section 8. See the map, Plaintiff's Ex. B. The 
last three wells were completed by December, 1954. It 
should be emphasized here that the change did not seek 
permission to withdraw more water from the basin. It 
merely changed the point at which the water was to be 
"'"ithdra\\'"11. This is important, because the testimony, 
\vithout contradiction, shows that it is the quantity with-
dra "'"n from the basin, and not the point at which it is 
\\~i thdra \\'"11 "'"hich has ra used the lowering of water tables 
and the interference \vith the sha1lo"" wells. 
From reading appellants' brief it appears that the 
eomplaint lH.>ing- made is not that \Ye are taking water 
from the llP\\. point of diversion, but rather they com-
plain b('en nHP "'"e are taking \\'"ater from the hydrologic 
basin at alL rp]H"r<."\ is no eYidence referred to by appel-
lants, nor is tlHlre allything in the record ey·en tending 
10 
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to show that the taking of a given quantity of water in 
Section 8 will cause more or less interference than the 
1'', 
taking of the same quantity of water in Sections 17 or 
18. As a matter of fact, the evidence is exactly to the 
contrary. The Irrigation Company is taking a total of 
2.74 c. f. s. from the basin at all five points. Two of the 
five wells were drilled at the original points, leaving ·~ \' 
about 2 c. f. s. from the three wells in Section 8. If the 
taking of 2 c. f. s. of water from Section 8 would interfere, 
but the taking of 2 c. f. s. from Sections 17 or 18 would 
not, then it would be the change, which would be causing 
the interference. For example, a well may be drilled so 
close to an existing well that it would directly and im-
mediately cause it to go dry. This may happen even 
though the quantity of water withdrawn from the basin 
by the new well has no measurable effect on water levels 
in the basin as a whole. The interference would be solely 
due to the close location. In this example, if the same 
well had been kept at a more distant point, there would 
have been no interference, even though the same quan-
·- tity of water were taken. In such an assumed case, it 
would be the close locatiDn with reference to the other 
well and not the amount of water taken which would 
cause the interference. None of this is involved here. 
None of the wells drilled by the Irrigation Company is 
located so close to the wells of the appellants as to cause 
that type of interference. The interference here results 
solely from the withdrawal of water from the basin. The 
lowering of water tables would have been the same if thP 
wells had been left at the original locations. It is thP 
taking of 1AJ'ater from the basin and not the I or·ation of 
11 
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the wells which gives grounds for complaint. Dr. Han-
sen again and again affirmed that this is true (R. 147). 
He said that the area in which the Irrigation Company 
wells were drilled is the lower part of the basin, and 
that: 
'.'I would have difficulty thinking that a slight 
location - change in the ·v .. ~ell would have any in-
fluence in the behavior of the basin itself. * * * 
I \\Tould see no particular reason to think that one 
location \Yould have much more influence on the 
basin than any other. The size of the well would 
he far more important." (R. 148) 
On cross-examination, beginning at page 171, the 
matter was explained in detail. He was asked whether 
taking the \Yater from the coarser materials where the 
last three "\veils ''ere drilled wouldn't ha--ve a tendency to 
cause greater interference with the flow wells. He an-
swered that he wouldn't see it that way. "It wouldn't 
make much difference whether you took the water out of 
one "\Veil or the other. If you lowered it (the water table) 
ten feet, it would haYe the same influence on the flowing 
well." He "Tent on to say, "The basin is so small that 
I can ,t belicYe that it 'vould make much difference where 
)TOn took the "Tater. It ''ould still haYe the same inter-
f\'rPIH'<.l, pro\'·iding you "Tithdre\Y the same quantity of 
"·a1Pr. '' H0 also noted that because of the location, the 
\\'Qll '"hieh "Tould interfert) "Tith the shallow 'veils the 
mo~t - - nlorl) than all the other " ... ells put together -
"·onld hP ;\ HdrP\Ys' O\\Tll pump \Yt:."}ll (R. 173). He \Yas 
corrohorat('d a8 to this hy all of the tests. By closing 
:lnd opt'ning the .A ndrl~\\T~ pump ''Tell itnmediate and sub-
1:2 
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stantial interference could be measured in the flow wells 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 20-24; R. 14-15). The same end result 
could be obtained by closing and opening the Irrigation 
Company wells, but the effect was less immediate 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 37). No witness testified to the contrary. 
The conclusion is inescapable that it is not the cha;nge in 
location, but the withdrawal of water which has affected 
the flow wells. The change was correctly approved. 
III. FOWKES v. CURRENT CREEK IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY .A.ND ANDREWS, CIVIL 
NO. 3770: 
In regard to Point III, the Andrews Group and the 
Irrigation Company are appellants, and the Fowkes 
Group are the respondents. If the court holds with the 
Irrigation Company on its contention (raised on its 
appeal) that there is no vested right to artesian pres-
sures, such holding would dispose of this Point III in its 
entirety. The Andrews Group in their brief have ig-
nored the brief filed by the Irrigation Company, so we 
have no way of knowing from their brief what position 
they take on the matters there raised. They do argue some 
additional matters as to which we need to comment. 
They first note the argument that the court ignored 
Andrews' legal rights established by contract. They 
argued this in detail on their appeal in the injunction 
suit, and we have answered it there. We will not repeat 
the argument here. 
Their next point also was argued by them in the ill-
junction suit. It is that the burden was on the Irrigation 
Company to show that its wells did not interfere with the 
13 
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springs and wells of the prior users. While this was 
argued by them in connection with the injunction suit 
we did not answer it there, for it relates to their clai~ 
for damages. 
A. In their suit for money damages, the burden 
of proof was on the Andrews Group 
We think that in making the assertion that the Irri-
gation Company had the burden of proof, the Andrews 
Group are not making a necessary distinction. The trial 
court's holding was contained in Finding No. 15. That 
finding " .. as in part as follows : 
''That Andrews has failed to sustain the bur-
den of proof, to show the net effect of the inter-
ference caused to his flowing ''ell, and spring by 
the Irrigation Company, as opposed to and dis-
tinguished from the effect caused by his own 
pump "~ell • • *. '' 
The Andrews Group had claimed damage for loss of 
crops because their flow wells and spring had ceased to 
flo"r. The evidence conclusively showed that their own 
pump \\rell \Yas a contributing cause of the lower water 
table. ..:\s the a hove quoted finding demonstrates, the case 
did not turn on the issue of interference, nor on the bur-
den of proof as to interference. Damages were denied to 
1\ndre\vs, solely beeause the court could not determine 
from the PYidence \Yhat portion of their claimed damage 
\\'as proximatt'ly caused by their o"rn pump and what part 
\vas eausPd by the Irrigation Company. Perhaps ·we 
should let the matter rt")st at this point, but even if the 
problem \VPre one of burden of proof as to interferenc-e, 
appPllants eannot preYnil. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The argument that the Irrigation Company has the 
burden of proof ''because it is the plaintiff,'' simply isn't 
correct. On the issue of damages, the Andrews Group 
were the plaintiffs. This issue was brought into the case 
by their cross-claim filed in the Fowkes suit. They sought 
affirmative relief in the form of money damages against 
the Irrigation Company. The fact that they did this by a 
pleading called a "cross-claim" rather than by a "com-
plaint'' makes no difference. The Andrews Group as 
plaintiffs were endeavoring to recover money damages. 
The Irrigation Company was the defendant. Clearly, the 
burden of proof in a damage suit is on the plaintiff. The 
trial court by its finding No. 15 so held and denied 
damages. 
The next reason given to support the argument that 
've had the burden of proof is based on a number of cases 
which hold that where an appropriator comes into a water 
basin and claims to have developed new 'vater, the bur-
den of proof is on him to show that he has in fact de-
veloped new water. This principle is so well established 
in the law as to be beyond question. But that principle 
simply isn't involved here. We have made no contention 
that we have found a new source of water. Admittedly, 
we drilled in the same hydrologic basin which supplies 
the springs, the shallow wells and the pump well. We are 
not contending that we have found a new and independent 
water supply. We admittedly have not developc~d new 
water. The cases cited by the appellants involve an en-
tirely different problem. In these cases an appropriator 
has gone into a basin, and drilled a well or dug a drain 
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or tunnel. He contends that the waters which he has 
intercepted would not have found their way to the stream 
and would not have been available to the prior appro-
priator. He claims he has developed new water. In a suit 
to quiet title, or in an appeal from a ruling on an applica-
tion to appropriate water, the courts have held that the 
new appropriator ha~ the burden of proving that he has 
found a new source of supply. If the evidence is in doubt, 
he must lose, for there is a presumption that water de-
veloped within a basin is a part of the basin. 
But we don't see how these cases help the Andrews 
Group. They have set up a "straw man" and destroyed 
it. Nobody is here contending that a new and independ-
ent source of water has been intercepted. All of the 
parties to this appeal have wells which are supplied by 
the same water source. There is a single hydrologic basin. 
By drawing water from this basin, the water level in the 
underground reservoir can be lowered. We admit that 
our 'veils contribute to the lowering of the " .. ater table, 
and in that manner interfere. But as is noted by the court 
in its Finding No. 15, the .A._ndrews pump well has the 
same effect, and damages " .. ere denied, because the 
court could not tell ho"· much of the claimed damage 
was caused by the Irrigation Company and how much by 
their o\\·n pump. As plaintiffs e.laiming damage the bur-
den of pro,·ing that the Irrigation (--.ompany caused their 
dama.ge "·n~ on them. 
We presume that the .A.ndre,Ys Group themselves 
c. an 't HPpR rn tP the damage, bee a use their only argument 
on nppPnl is thnt on n dnmng-(_~ suit '"'e had the burden of 
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\.~ 
l!.' 
proof, and this, of course, is not the law. The court com-
mitted no error in this regard. 
B. There was no error in Finding No. 15. 
The next assignment of error is that the court erred 
in making its Finding No. 15 to the effect that the Irri-
gation Company well had not measurably interfered with 
the Andrew' ''springs and wells.'' Reference to the find-
ing at Tr. 169 will show that the court didn't mention 
springs in this part of the finding. Its finding in this re-
gard was: 
"and that Andrews has failed to sho\v any 
measurable interference between the Irrigation 
Company wells and his pump \vell.'' 
This is a correct finding. Andrews testified himself 
that even with the Irrigation Company wells flowing, he 
was still able to get water and he was not able to say that 
he was not getting his full 6 c. f. s. from his pump well 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 6). There is thus no measurable interfer-
ence. Mr. Mayo said that with his pump Andrews can get 
his full 6 c.f.s. right (Vol. 2, p. 39). His only possible com-
plaint could be that he is having to pump the water an 
additional distance - but how much~ What would the 
drawdown be from his own pumping~ I-Iow much greater 
is his lift because our wells exist~ If this court ltolds that 
he had a vested right to artesian pressure, nn<1 in addition 
holds that the last person to drill has the burden of prov-
ing how much drawdown would come from the pump, how 
much from nature, and how much from the new well~'-\, all 
ground \Vater development has come to an end. Here 
Andre"rs is able to get every drop of "rater to whirh lH~ is 
17 
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entitled with his existing pump. Still he claimed dam-
ages. In his claim for damage he was unable to show how 
much of the drawdown was caused by his own pumping 
operation. The court so found, and this was not error. 
C. The Irrigation Company ~vells were not the 
sole cause of the lowered water table. 
The Andrews Group urge that the court could have 
found that the Irrigation Company wells were the sole 
cause of the shallow wells going dry. Such is not the evi-
dence. The evidence shows that Andrews have been with-
drawing 6 c. f. s. from the underground basin by means 
of a pump. The period of use under their application 
covers from April 1st to October 15th, a period of 198 
days (Ex. A-30). Six c. f. s. will yield 12 acre feet per day, 
and over the irrigation season allowed in their approved 
application, this would permit withdrawal of 2376 acre 
feet of water per season. The evidence shows that in 1954 
the well was pumped from May through November ('7 ol. 
2, page 103) and thus approximately 2300 acre feet were 
\vithdra"\\rn by Andre,vs that season. 
The shallow flow "\\7ells were capped in the Fall of 
1954. When they 'vere opened a.bout .4.-\.pril1st, 1955, they 
wouldn't flo"·· Gerald Fowkes so testified (R,. 89). The 
Andrews Group contend that since their pumps were shut 
off in N o\·ember of 1~1;)4, and the sha.llo"r 'vells were dry 
when the~· \Yere opeiH.}d the follo,ving April, the Irrigation 
Compnny "·e1ls drilled in 1954 must be held to the sole 
cause. '~J..1hi ~ just eonld not be so. 
Our last three \\"Plls w·ere completed by December of 
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u~) 1954, and as the court found in its Finding No. 5, the five 
l~): wells combined yield, without pumping, 2.74 c. f. s., 
~~ or 5.48 acre feet per day. After the Andrews pump well 
it was closed in November, 1954, the Irrigation Company 
took 5.48 acre feet of water per day for a period .of less 
than 120 days. This would have withdrawn about 660 acre 
feet of water. The Andrews' argument, if correct, would 
~~ require the court to hold (1) that this 660 acre feet was 
the sole cause of the flow wells going dry; (2) that the 
Andrews Group's withdrawal during the previous sum-
~:; mer, of 2300 acre feet, had nothing whatever to do with it; 
~~ (3) that Andrews could have started their pump well in 
the Spring of 1955, and taken 2300 acre feet that summer, 
and 2300 in the summer of 1956, and that their with-
drawal would not have diminished the flow in the flow 
,: ·wells. Clearly if our 660 acre feet would have dried up 
the flow wells, the withdrawal of 2300 acre feet the next 
season by Andrews would have had the same effect and 
the Andrews pump well was pumped both in 1955 
and 1956. 
Counsel also point to the testimony of Roundy to thP 
effect that the pumping of the Andrews well increasrd the 
flow of the Andrews flow wells. This is noted to convin('e 
the court that the pump well did not hurt the flow wellR. 
Yet the tests conducted by the State Engineer es1al>liRhed 
beyond any doubt that by opening and closing the An-
drews pump well, the water table in the And rP"'S flo"· 
wells could be raised and lowered. These tests were con-
ducted by Mr. Mayo. He noted a direct and immediate 
connection between the two (Vol. 2, p. 20-24, R. 14-15). 
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The connection is more direct and more immediate than 
the connection with the Irrigation Company wells 
(Vol. 2, p. 30). 
Andrews was the plaintiff seeking money damage, 
and the court held on this evidence that it could not de-
termine the extent to which our usage and the extent to 
which Andrews' usage contributed to drying up the flow 
wells, and how much of Andrews' own damage was caused 
by their own operations. 
IV. WE AGREE THAT THE COURT DISRE-
GARDED PRIORITIES. 
The Andrews Group complained because the court 
did not acknowledge the priority on their flow wells and 
pump wells, but they too over-simplify the problem. They 
say that the court approached the problem as though 
there were only two priorities. First came Fowkes and 
then all the rest. The Andrews Group want to treat the 
matter as though there were only three priorities. First, 
the Fowkes, second the Andrews, and third the Irriga-
tion Company. Neither approac.h is correct. 
The earliest priorities are the spring rights. The 
court has expressly held t.ha t the springs belong to An-
drews aud Fowkes during the irrigation season and to the 
Irrigation Company during the rest of the year. Thus, 
the Irrigation Company is itself interested in the spring 
\Vater, e111d if any kind of a priority system is going to 
he put into effect, thflY arP n~ much entitled to the spring 
flo\v 8:-\ nre the others. The irrigation season seldom lasts 
more thnn 1 flO day~. During the oth~r t"ro hundred odd 
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I\!: days the springs would belong to the Irrigation Company. 
1! 1 Thus, all three of the parties hereto from the point of 
priority have equal rights in the priorities which govern 
"' I 
the springs. 
The second priorities in point of time are the shallow 
wells. These are owned by Andrews and Fowkes. The 
court made no effort to fix which "\vere first. 
The third priority is the railroad well which is leased 
and under the control of the Irrigation Company now but 
it is owned by the railroad. It has dried up, and any re-
placement order, if administered strictly on a priority 
basis, would have to provide for the railroad well. 
The fourth order of priority would be the Andrews 
pump well. The fifth order of priority would be the Irri-
gation Company wells, which at the moment are pro-
duced only by flow, but which will have to be pumped to 
give to the Irrigation Company its appropriated right. 
Then come other filings which are in the same basin 
and which are either drilled or to be drilled in the future. 
There were at least three existing filings which had been 
made after the Irrigation Company's filings. 
These were pending before the State Engineer at 
the time of the trial. The evidence, as is argued in detail 
in our appellant's brief, is to the effect that there is still 
unappropriated water in the basin. A.s the threp filings 
which were made by persons not parties to this suit n re 
developed and still new filings are placed in the basin, an 
order "\vhich requires replacements now will not be appro-
priate if the other 'veils are drilled. 
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If the court holds against us on the main point in-
volved in this appeal, to-wit, that there is a vested right 
in artesian pressure, we believe that some provision must 
be made to administer the water rights. The court should 
not simply order each of the parties to replace half of the 
water for the plaintiffs Fowkes under all conditions. This 
would be res judicata as between these parties, no matter 
what happens. During any given water year, it may be 
that the Andrews' well could be pumped without drying 
up the flow wells, and that during such a year (if there 
were any way to identify it) perhaps the Irrigation Com-
pany should replace all the water. There may be other 
times during dry years when the Irrigation Company 
wells should be shut off for a number of years, and An-
drews would be compelled to replace all the water, includ-
ing our winter flow from the springs and our flow from 
the railroad well. If we start pumping our wells, which 
we have the right to do, our withdrawal may far exceed 
that by Andrews. If Andrews drills his second well, 
'vhich he has the right to do, his withdrawals may far 
exceed ours. As other parties drill, they, if the same 
rule applies, would ha.Ye to pump for all of us. A hard and 
fa.st rule should not be entered to become frozen or fixed 
for all time to eome, eYen if circumstances change. 
CPrtainl~,. there "·ill be no administration of water on 
a priority basis "·here, "·ithout regard to the quantity 
available in the basin, or the quantity used Andrews and 
the Irrigation Compnny aTe each ordered to replace one-
half of the "·a ter for the Fo,vkes. It ignores the Irrigation 
Compn ny '~ ""inter rights. It ignores the Irrigation Com-
pany·H rnilrond 'Yell rig-hts. It ignores the .A.ndre"rs flow 
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well rights, all of which are prior to the Andrews pump 
well and the Irrigation Company flow well. We too be-
lieve that the court's solution to the problem presented 
is arbitrary, incomplete and ineffectual. A more flexible 
rule which can be administered should, in any event, be 
ordered. 
V. WATER IS NOT BEING "~liNED." 
An effort is apparePtly made on page 33 of the An-
drews brief to demonstrate that water is being ''mined'' 
from this basin. This isn't supported by the evidence. 
The maximum drawdown during the period of maxi-
mum use didn't take the water more than nine feet from 
the surface (Vol. 2, p. 38). Both Dr. Hansen and Mr. 
Mayo were of the· opinion that the basin had not been 
fully appropriated (VoL 2, p. 58-59, 198-9, 147). After 
full use by Andrews and the Irrigation Company in 1955, 
the water table had come up, and the flow wells had 
started to flow by April of 1956 (R.66). A_fter full use 
in the summer of 1956, the water table was coming back 
at the time of the trial and was in fact rising ''rather 
sharply," (R. 24). In fact, on December 6, 1956, the date 
of the trial, one well had started to flow ( R. 32). Cer-
tainly this clearly shows that the basin is not over-a p-
propriated. Also, 1954 to 1956, were relatively dry water 
years (R. 37). The fact of the matter is that we have an 
underground reservoir which is lowered only a few fePt 
during periods of use, but it has come back nearly to 
ground surface in the winter and both at the end of the 
1955 season (R. 90) and the 1956 season, at least one of 
the wells had started to flow (R. 32). The trial court found 
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as a faet that there is unappropriated water in the basin. 
Certainly this finding is supported by the above noted 
evidence. 
VI. IT WAS NOT ERROR TO STRIKE ~IR. 
GARDNER'S TESTIMONY ON EVAPO-
RATION AND TRANSPORTATION 
LOSSES. 
There was no issue presented by the pleadings which 
would challenge the validity of the Irrigation Company's 
appropriation from the wells. Nobody denied that the 
Irrigation Company had initiated a valid right. We are 
not told by counsel what issue this testimony was cal-
culated to solve. 
The parties could have spent a considerable amount 
of time going into the question of irrigation efficiency. 
Certainly, there would be evaporation losses from every 
reservoir in the state. ~Ir. Gardner made no effort to 
show (nor could he have done so) that there is any-
thing unusual about ours, or that losses from it were 
unusual. In this state it is a novel argument indeed to 
argue that a water right be denied because the water is to 
be placed in storage. There also are fe"~, if any, canal 
systems in the state thnt don "t have some transportation 
losses, both through eYaporation and canal seepage. After 
the "·ater rearhes the la11d, irrigation efficiency in flood-
type irrigation seldom reac.hes as high as 50 per cent. 
But again there is nothing extreme in our system. We 
could haYP spent t"·o or three days sho\\ring the crops we 
raise, thPir eash Yalue, the number of Jiyestock, irrigated 
acres, Pte., to sho"· thnt \Ve make n beneficial use of the 
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water, but what purposes would have been served in this 
lawsuit by so doing is nowhere shown. Thus, no issue was 
presented which would make this testimony material, 
and the court correctly so ruled. 
VII. THE COURT CORRECTLY HEI_JD THAT 
FOWKES DID NOT MITIGATE THEIR 
DAMAGES. 
By way of a cross-appeal, the Fowkes Group contend 
that they should have been granted judgment for loss of 
crops. The court found that they have suffered $1500.00 
in damages, but denied judgment, because no effort was 
made to mitigate damages. 
It is fundamental to the law of damages that a per-
son claiming damage must not increase his damages by 
his own acts or by his failure to take active steps to mini-
mize the loss, so long as unreasonable expense or exer-
tion would not be involved. According to the Fowkes' 
o'vn testimony, they knew about the 1st of April, or a lit-
tle bit earlier (R. 85, 90) that their flow wells had ceased 
to flow. Still in 1955 two of the plaintiffs Fowkes claimed 
to have planted their lands to crops of barley. They knew 
they weren't going to have the flow well water. The same 
condition existed in 1956. Gerald Fowkes testified (R. 90) 
that before the 1st of April, 1956, he opened the flow wells 
and found that they would not flow. Still he again planted 
his lands to barley. He claims $1152.00 for loss of 600 
bushels of barley each year. John Fowkes also claims 
400 bushels of barley lost in 1955 and 300 bushels of bar-
ley lost in 1956, and claims a total of $672.00. The judge's 
finding in regard to damagPs doesn't indicatP how the 
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court arrived at the $1500. It merely fixed the amount. 
As to this claim for loss of bar ley the rnle is stated in 
McCormick on Damages, Section 34, page 131, as follows: 
''Where a purchaser of land learns that his 
vendor had no title to an irrigation ditch which he 
had purported to sell, and thereafter the pur-
chaser proceeds to plant a crop, he cannot recover 
for the cost of planting and loss of crop due to 
the failure to secure water for irrigation." 
The plaintiffs ought not to be permitted to recover 
anything for the barley which they planted in 1955 and 
1956, when under their own testimony they knew that 
their flow wells were dry. To plant a crop of barley and 
then sue for its loss comes squarely within the prohibi-
tion in the above-stated principle. 
When the court ordered Andrews and the Irrigation 
Company to replace the water for the Fowkes, it also ex-
pressly decreed : 
'' • • • proYided, however, that such replace-
ment • • • shall be limited to the furnishing and 
installing of pumps, pumping equipment and 
sources of po"·cr, capable of making such replace-
ment of \Yater * • $. it being the duty of Fo·wkes 
to keep the "·ell casings in such state of repair 
that the pump mny properly operate so long as 
t1Hl "·ntPl' tuhlt ... remains at a point "·here "rater can 
be pumped from each "rell as each \Yell now 
Pxi~t~" ('rr. 174). 
No appeal is taken from this ruling, and it has be-
come the la."· of the rase. The duty is thus upon the 
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~~ 
Fowkes to provide casings in such a state of repair as 
to permit pumping of the wells. This is emphasized be-
cause .of the mitigation of damage point. The Fowkes 
group state that it would have cost $7700.00 to drill 
and equip. Under the court's ruling- from which there 
has been no appeal -the cost of drilling a well, if that 
be necessary, is the burden or cost of the Fowkes. 
The Fowkes also on their mitigation of damage point 
take the approach that in order to mitigate they had to 
buy a pump. This was not necessary. There isn't any 
reason why they could not rent pumps. This is particularly 
true in regard to the claimed damages for hauling water. 
Water was available in the well right by the home of Mr. 
Fowkes. All he needed was a small quantity of water for 
household use. Instead of renting or buying a small pump 
he traveled considerable distances and expended time and 
money hauling water. 
The water was almost at ground surface. They had 
the duty to maintain their casings so that pumps could 
be attached. It was obvious that for water to be diverted, 
at their wells, pumps would have to be attached. The 
problem was not whether the water should be pumped, 
but who should pay the cost of pumping and the cost 
of installing the pumps. Instead of renting pumps and 
pumping the water they needed, they went v. .. ithout \ratPr 
and yet planted barley on part of the land, even though 
they knew in April that their wells would not flow. They 
made no effort whatever to get the water. They kne"r 
that they didn't have the water available to them. They 
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then planted barley and sued for nearly $1800.00 dam-
ages when the barley didn't mature. 
We do not disagree with the authorities cited by 
Fowkes. It is the application of that law to the facts of 
this case where we disagree. They approach the question 
as though we had the duty of drilling for them a new well, 
because the casings on their old well are worn out and 
won't stand pumping (Ex. CC-1). The trial court held 
to the contrary, and from this holding they have not ap-
pealed, and it is the law of the case. 
They apparently didn't want to replace their worn-
out casings, and so they simply went without water. If 
the court affirms this judgment and orders us to equip 
their wells with pumps, this is still going to be a problem, 
for some of their wells are deteriorated and worn out (Ex. 
CC-1). The court held that they had failed to mitigate 
their damages. We submit that such holding was correct. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Current Creek 
I rrigationf C omp·a;n.y 
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